

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 0150

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FOR THE SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY SISCO, COUNSELOR
SONNENFELDT, DIRECTOR HYLAND, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MULCAHY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR FR US AO

SUBJECT: ANGOLA

SUMMARY. I MET WITH JOURNIAC FOR ABOUT 75 MINUTES MORN-
ING DECEMBER 5 FOR AN IN-DEPTH TOUR D'HORIZON ON ANGOLA.
WE TALKED ABOUT BOLSTERING THE AFRICAN MODERATES, THE
SOUTH AFRICAN ANGLE, COORDINATION OF TACTICS AT ADDIS
DURING THE OAU MEETING, AND STEPPING UP THE PRESSURE
AGAINST CUBA. END SUMMARY.

1. BOLSTERING THE AFRICAN MODERATES: JOURNIAC TOURED
FRANCOPHONE AFRICA IN EARLY DECMBER. COMPARING NOTES
ON OUR TWO TRIPS, WE AGREED THAT MOST OF THE MODREATES
HAD BEEN IN A SEMI-STATE OF SHCOK AS A RESULT OF THE
MASSIVE SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION, AND HEY STILL NEEDED
THE STIFFENING PROVIDED BY THE PERSONAL MESSAGES FROM
PRESIDENT FORD ANDPRESIDENT GISCARD. JOURNIAC WAS
PLEASED AT MY CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ABOUT PROSPECTS THAT
THE MODERATES WILL STAND FIRM AGAINST MPLA RECOGNITION
BY THE OAU, BUT WAS NOT SURPRISED WHEN I TOLD HIM BONGO,
AHIDJO AND HOUPHOUET WERE STILL HESITATING ABOUT ATTEND-
ING THE SUMMIT IN PERSON. JOURNIAC SAID THE TRADITION-
AL ATTITUDE OF THE MODERATE LEADERS IS TO STAY AWAY FROM

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SUMMIT MEETINGS WHEN THE OAU IS IN A STATE OF DEEP DIVI-

SION, THEREBY ALLOWING THE RADICAL MINORITY TO DOMINATE. WE AGREED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO APPLY PRESSURE TO BACK UP SENGHOR'S EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ATTENDANCE AND A SOLID FRONT OF MODERATES AT ADDIS.

2. IN RESPONSE TO MY OBSERVATION THAT AHIDJO SHOWED REMARKABLE FIRMNESS AGAINST OAU RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA, JOURNIAC SAID THAT AHIDJO SEES ANOTHER BIAFRA SITUATION IN THE MAKING IN ANGOLA, AND WANTS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DE FACTO PARTITION DOES NOT BECOME PERMANENT. JOURNIAC SAID HE HAS A LOT OF RESPECT FOR AHIDJO, BUT SEES HIM AS A VERY SKEPTICAL PERSON WHO IS DOMINATED BY FATALISM.

3. ON MOBUTU, I EXPRESSED MY CONCERNS ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO TRANSLATE HIS GOOD WORDS INTO EFFECTIVE PARLIAMENTARY MANEUVERING AT THE OAU. JOURNIAC REPLIED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER BULA SHOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN THIS RESPECT. HAVING HAD A MARXIST EDUCATION IN THE SOVIET UNION, BULA IS NOT AT ALL INTIMIDATED BY RADICALS AND THEIR RHETORIC. BULA SHOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN KEEPING THE GABONESE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO IS AN EXCELLENT SPEAKER, FROM CAVING IN TO THE REVOLUTIONARIES. JOURNIAC SAID THAT WHEN HE SAW MOBUTU, HE FOUND HIM PARTICULARLY AT A LOSS OF IDEAS IN THE FACE OF THE MASSIVE SOVIET ASSAULT. I SAID THAT MOBUTU IS SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME WORRYING ABOUT FUTURE LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND NOT ENOUGH ABOUT IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. JOURNIAC AGREED, AND REVEALED THAT DURING THEIR TALKS, MOBUTU SAID HE WAS THINKING ABOUT PROPOSING AGREEMENT TO THE MPLA TO CEDE THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF ANGOLA TO ZAIRE IN RETURN FOR RECOGNITION. JOURNIAC SAID HE WARNED MOBUTU OF THE EXTREME DANGERS OF PURSUING SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION.

4. ON THE GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE MODERATES, JOURNIAC SAID THE LEADERSHIP REACTED TO THE SOVIET-CUBAN ASSAULT BY BECOMING EITHER NUMB OR RESIGNED. DURING EARLY DECEMBER THEY SAW THE UNITED STATES AS DROPPING OUT FOR DOMESTIC REASONS, AND FRANCE AS RELATIVELY INDIFFERENT. THEY BEGAN TO SEE THE ANGOLAN SITUATION AS AN EAST-WEST SUPER-POWER PROBLEM THAT DID NOT CONCERN THEM ESSENTIALLY

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BECAUSE THEY WERE HELPLESS. THE GABONESE, WHO SAW THE FIRST FOREIGN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO HIT INDEPENDENT AFIRCA NEAR THEIR FRONTIER, BECAME UNDERSTANDABLY SCARED. THE OTHERS WERE ALSO IMPRESSED BY THIS SHOW OF FORCE. THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN EXPRESSIONS OF BOTH FIRMNESS AND THE DETERMINATION TO STICK THE STRUGGLE OUT TO THE END HAD A NOTICEABLY FAVORABLE IMPACT ON THE MODERATES. WITH RESPECT TO GABON, I TOLD JOURNIAC THAT WE HAD

AGREED TO SEND A MILITARY MISSION TO LIBREVILLE EXPRESS-
LY TO COUNTER THE NEGATIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE
CUBAN PRESENCE, BUT THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF REPLAC-
ING THE GOF AS PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER. HOURNIAC SAID
HE UNDERSTOOD THIS PERFECTLY, AND ENCOURAGED IT. HE
POINTED OUT THE POTENTIAL INTERNAL PROBLEMS FOR BONGO'S
SURVIVAL IF HE BUILDS UP TOO STRONG AN ARMY OR PRESIDENT-
IAL GUARD, A VIEW THAT I FOUND EMINENTLY LOGICAL. I
ASKED JOURNIAC ABOUT THE REACTIONS TO GISCARD'S LETTERS
THE THIRTEEN AFRICAN LEADERS. JOURNIAC SAID THE
AFRICANS ARE NOT GOOD LETTER WRITERS,, AND DO NOT REPLY
EASILY, BUT HE KNOWS FOR CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE PERSON-
ALLY VERY MOVED BY PRESIDENTIAL ATTENTIONS OF THIS SORT
AND URGED US NOT TO FORGET THIS ASPECT OF OUR RELATION-
SHIPS AS THE ANGOLAN CRISIS CONTINUES TO UNFOLD. I
INFORMED HIM THAT WE HAD HAD SOME GOOD INFORMAL REAC-
TIONS TO PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTERS.

5. THE SOUTH AFRICANS: I ASKED JOURNIAC ABOUT HIS
LATEST READINGS OF SOUTH AFRICAN INTENTIONS. HE SAID
THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAD TOLD HIM THEY EXPECT TO BE PULL-
ING OUT OF ANGOLA. THAT IS, THEY WOULD BE PULLING OUT
OFFICIALLY BUT WOULD FIND A WAY OF LEAVING BEHIND 200 OR
300 UNOFFICIAL VOLUNTEERS WHO COULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE
THE EQUIPMENT. HE SAID THE TROUBLE WITH THE SOUTH
AFRICANS IS THAT THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND BLACK AFRICAN
PSYCHOLOGY EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN NEIGHBORS FOR

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SO LONG. THEY DO NOT REALIZE THAT THE BLACK AFRICANS REACT EMOTIONALLY, AND BASE THEIR POLICY ON PASSIONS. FOR THE SOUTH AFRICANS TO TRY AND POLITICIZE THEIR PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WAS PURE FOLLY. THE FRENCH ALSO DO NOT APPRECIATE SOUTH AFRICAN BALCKMAIL--EXERCIZED BOTH ON THE GOF AND THE US - RELATED TO THEBROADER SOUTHERN AFRICAN SITUATION. JOURNIAC REVEALED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER MULLER WAS IN KINSHASA LAST WEEKEND FOR TALKS WITH MOBUTU. HE SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST CONTACT AT THAT LEVEL IN A LONG TIME, AND WAS ENCOURAGING. HE SAID ONLY HALF JOKINGLY THAT HE HOPED MOBUTU AND MULLER WOULD NOT ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE AFTER THE TALKS.

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7. I SUGGESTED, AND JOURNIAC AGREED, THAT THE FRENCH, AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS IN ADDIS BE INSTRUCTED TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON TACTICS BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE OAU SESSIONS. JOURNIAC ADDED THAT WE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE CAMEROONIAN AMBASSADOR IN ADDIS ABABA, WHO IS VERY EFFECTIVE AND IS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF AHIDJO.

8. WE AGREED ON THE FOUR BASIC POINTS WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IN AN OAU RESOLUTION -- CEASE FIRE, END TO ARMS DELIVERIES, A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT UNDER OAU AUSPICES, AND AN END TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

9. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF EVENTUAL UN INVOLVEMENT, WE AGREED THAT THIS IDEA IS PICKING UP SUPPORT IN A NUMBER OF MODERATE QUARTERS. JOURNIAC SAID HE HAD FOUND LESS AFRICAN OPPOSITION TO UN INVOLVEMENT THAN AT PREVIOUS TIMES. THIS IS BASED, HE SAID ON THE UNDERSTANDABLE FEAR THAT THE OAU MAY BE UNABLE TO COPE WITH THE

ANGOLAN PROBLEM. DESPITE THIS TENDENCY TO SHIFT THE ANGOLAN ISSUE TO THE UN, THE AFRICANS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID AN OAU SHOWDOWN FIRST, AND WE SHOULD NOT LET THE MODERATES FALL BACK FROM THE CONFRONTATION THINKING THE UN WILL SAVE THE DAY.

10. SAVIMBI-HOLDEN PROBLEM: JOURNIAC COMPLAINED THAT THE SAVIMBI-HOLDEN CONFRONTATION IS BECOMING WORSE, AND IT WILL BECOME A CATASTROPHE IF IT BECOMES PUBLIC. HE SAID THEY ACTUALLY CAME TO BLOWS A FEW WEEKS AGO. THE BASIC PROBLEM IS THAT HOLDEN IS VERY POOR ON HUMAN RELATIONS, JOURNIAC SAID, AND THIS COUNTS A GREAT DEAL AMONG AFRICANS. SAVIMBI IS EXCELLENT IN THIS REGARD, AND WHILE HOLDEN IS ON THE FIGHTING FRONT, SAVIMBI IS CIRCULATING IN AFRICA AND DEVELOPING HIS IMAGE. SAVIMBI, OF COURSE, IS MUCH WEAKER IN RESISTING THE MPLA THAN HOLDEN, JOURNIAC SAID, AND MUST BE WATCHED CLOSELY. HE DEPLORED THE FACT THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE ONLY INTERMITTENT CONTACT WITH SAVIMBI, AND ASKED IF WE COULD DO ANYTHING FILL THIS GAP. I SAID WE WOULD TRY.

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11. THE CUBANS: JOURNIAC SAID THAT GISCARD WAS PREPARING A MESSAGE TO CASTRO INFORMING HIM THE FRENCH CONSIDER IT INTOLERABLE THAT THE CUBANS HAVE SENT THE FIRST FOREIGN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICA. WE THEN EXPLORED POSSIBILITIES FOR THIRD PARTY PRESSURE ON CUBA. I FILLED JOURNIAC IN ON WHAT WE HAD DONE WITH BARBADOS, TRINIDAD AND GUYANA WITH RESPECT TO CUBAN LOGISTICS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GERMANS AND BRITISH HAVE GOOD RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND MIGHT BE HELPFUL. I AGREED TO RAISE THIS ISSUE IN BONN AND LONDON.

12. IN MIDDLE OF OUR MEETING, JOURNIAC WAS CALLED AWAY FOR ABOUT TEN MINUTES WITH GISCARD. WHEN HE RETURNED HE SAID THAT GISCARD SENT HIS PERSONAL REGARDS AND THANKS FOR MY VISIT, AND REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION TO PERSIST IN WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ENDEAVOR.

13. I TOLD JOURNIAC THAT EVEN THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL WE ARE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE OUR PRESENT COMMON POLICY AND HOPED FRANCE INTENDED TO DO THE SAME. JOURNIAC SAID INDEED THEY WOULD.

14. WE AGREED THAT I WOULD DISCUSS ONLY THE DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE ANGOLA PROBLEM WITH THE QUAI (SEPTEL).

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